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This thesis focuses on estimating faults in complex large-scale integrated aircraft 
systems, especially where they interact with, and control, the aircraft dynamics. A general 
assumption considered in the reliability of such systems is that any component level fault 
will be monitored, detected and corrected by some fault management capability. 
However, a reliance on fault management assumes not only that it can detect and manage 
all faults, but also that it can do so in sufficient time to recover from any deviation in the 
aircraft dynamics and flight path.  
Testing for system-level effects is important to ensure better reliability of aircraft 
systems. However, with existing methods for validation of complex aircraft systems, it is 
difficult and impractical to set up a finite test suite to enable testing and integration of all 
the components of a complex system. The difficulty lies in the cost of modelling every 
aspect of every component given the large number of test cases required for sufficient 
coverage. Just having a good simulator, or increasing the number of test cases is not 
sufficient; it is also important to know which simulation runs to conduct. For this 
purpose, the thesis proposes simulating faults in the system through the violation of 
“axiomatic conditions” of the system components, which are conditions on the 
functioning of these components introduced during their development. The thesis studies 
the effect, on the aircraft dynamics, of simulating such faults when reference models of 




1.1 Problem Statement 
This thesis proposes a simulation-based method to streamline the validation of 
complex large-scale integrated aircraft systems, particularly those involving adaptive 
controllers of the aircraft dynamics. Such systems can fail when the integration of their 
many components causes unexpected, undesired interactions between their individual 
behaviors. Such interactions may occur when a failure in one component cascades 
through the system; further, such a failure may even occur when all components are 
functioning correctly, but do not collectively provide the desired system performance. A 
general assumption considered in the reliability of aircraft systems with adaptive control 
is that any component level fault will be monitored, detected and corrected by some fault 
management capability. However, a reliance on fault management assumes not only that 
it can detect and manage all faults, but also that it can do so in a time span lesser than the 
time in which the aircraft dynamics and adaptive control could be affected by the fault.  
Thus, this thesis examines how faults can ripple through a system by simulating the key 
dynamics within the system before and after any fault management may resolve them. 
Testing for system-level effects is important to ensure better reliability of aircraft 
systems. However, with existing methods for validation of complex aircraft systems, it is 
difficult and impractical to set up a finite test suite to enable testing and integration of all 
the components of a complex system. The difficulty lies in the cost of modelling every 
aspect of every component given the large number of test cases required for sufficient 
coverage. Thus, it is not sufficient to just have a good simulator, or to increase the detail 
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of the models of the components in the system being tested, or to increase the number of 
test cases; it is also important to know which simulation runs to conduct. This requires 
some insight into when a component will fail, or when a component may be technically 
working but might not meet the requirements of other components, causing the system as 
a whole to fail. Thus, this thesis provides a method to understand when the system will 
fail and identify which test cases should be run. 
1.2 Some Key Definitions 
For the purpose of this thesis we define the following relevant terms: 
System: Integrated set of components integrated that accomplish a defined objective. 
Components: Individual elements of a system which serve specific functions and work in 
collaboration with other components in the system to achieve an overall goal. 
Complex Systems: Systems consisting of components without a centralized control, such 
that addition of another component into the system can increase the interactions between 
the components non-linearly. 
Component Functions: Tasks to be performed by a component of a system to enable the 
system to achieve its overall objective. 
Axiomatic Set of Conditions: Logical operations on the internal states and external 
conditions of a component of a complex aircraft system that identify whether the 
component is guaranteed to perform its intended functions as expected. 
Fault: A condition in which a component is unable to perform its function as intended. 
Fault Detection: Recognizing that a fault has occurred in a component of the system. 
Fault Management: Action involving managing the fault after it has been detected by 
notifying relevant components about the occurrence of the fault, which in turn would 
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apply the necessary corrective actions to recover the aircraft behavior to the intended 
state. 
Validation: (1) INCOSE SE Handbook v. 3.2.2 – Appendix D: Confirmation, through the 
provision of objective evidence, that the requirements for a specific intended use or 
application have been fulfilled [ISO 9000: 2000]. 
(2) SAE ARP4754 (2.2 Definitions): The determination that the requirements for a 
product are correct and complete. [Are we building the right aircraft/ system/ function/ 
item?] 
Verification: (1) INCOSE SE Handbook v. 3.2.2 – Appendix D: Confirmation, through 
the provision of objective evidence, that specified requirements have been fulfilled [ISO 
9000: 2000] 
(2) SAE ARP4754 (2.2 Definitions): The evaluation of an implementation of requirements 
to determine that they have been met. [Did we build the aircraft/ system/ function/ item 
right?] 
1.3 Motivation 
Distributed architectures are becoming increasingly popular in aircraft systems 
due to their ease of installation, configuration and subsequent updating. Distributed 
systems consist of several components that cooperate to achieve a common goal. The 
asynchronous execution of their processes without a central top-down control, however, 
can cause the emergence of unexpected behavior at the system level.1 
Each of the components in a complex distributed system individually has ranges 
of conditions under which it can operate, such as limits on bank angle, maximum speed, 
environmental conditions, etc. The limits on one component may be different from those 
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on another component in the system. They may also have certain assumptions made 
during their design, like known aircraft behavior in response to a given control input, or 
certain functions being assumed to be executed by another component. These so called 
“axiomatic set of conditions” can thus affect the behavior of the system as a whole when 
the integrated components are in operation. Hence, it is important to validate these 
components by validating the axiomatic conditions in the integrated environment: 
intensive testing and validation of just the individual components may not be sufficient to 
see these system-wide effects. 
1.3.1 Study of Aircraft Accidents and Incidents 
The following examples show how the violation of the axiomatic set of conditions 
of a component can affect the system in situations with missing or delayed inputs, a 
component fault, adverse environmental conditions, exceeding the operating range of a 
component, etc. These examples have been analyzed by understanding the system and 
components involved in the accident causation, their functions in regard to the task that 
was to be performed, the way in which the components were integrated and 
communicated with each other, the axiomatic set of conditions of the components; the 
violation of which led to the accidents, and the flight and environmental conditions under 
which this violation of axioms occurred.  
 
1. Bombardier Learjet 60 Runway overrun (September 19, 2008): This accident 
developed from a failure of the main landing gear to the aircraft overrunning the 
runway during takeoff due to the failure of axiomatic conditions of the thrust 
reverser and Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) systems.2,3 
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Components: Relevant components include the thrust reversers, sensors for the 
thrust reverser system, electronic engine control computers, the Full Authority 
Digital Engine Control (FADEC) system and the pilot or flight crew.  
Component Functions and Relationships: The thrust reversers, when deployed, 
provide deceleration force to assist with ground braking. The pilot can command 
forward or reverse thrust by operating the thrust levers. The electronic engine 
control (EEC) computers obtain information about the thrust lever angle, and 
provide corresponding electronic signals to each engine’s full authority digital 
electronic control (FADEC) components. Based on the signals received from the 
EECs, the FADEC components, which perform functions such as thrust 
management and compressor surge control, regulate engine output to provide the 
level of engine power commanded by the pilot. The thrust reverser system applies 
logic control functions to prevent certain operations based on specific sensor 
inputs. These include squat switches located on the main landing gears which 
signal whether the airplane is on the ground, sensors to confirm that thrust 
reverser doors are fully open to release the thrust reverser levers, and 
microswitches to indicate that the thrust reverser levers are lifted before signaling 
the EEC and FADEC components to use reverse thrust engine power. 
Axiomatic conditions: The thrust reverser system requires a positive signal from 
the squat switches on the main landing gear that the landing gear is on the ground. 
Hence, if the signal is missing the airplane is assumed to be in “air mode” and the 
thrust reversers cannot be deployed. The EECs, upon receiving the signal that 
thrust reversers are stowed and squat switches indicate air mode, gives a signal to 
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the FADEC components to change the engine thrust output to forward thrust, 
accelerating the aircraft. 
Flight Conditions: Insufficient inflation in the right main landing gear caused its 
disintegration after the pilots initiated the takeoff roll and the aircraft passed the 
takeoff decision speed (V1), that is, the maximum speed at which the airplane can 
be stopped within the accelerate-stop distance if brakes are applied. The signal 
from the squat switches on the main landing gear was missing due to the damage. 
The pilots attempted to abort takeoff after V1. 
System Behavior: The rupture of the landing gear hindered the pilots’ ability to 
apply brakes. The thrust reverser system overrode the pilots’ command to deploy 
thrust reversers, as the axiom requiring a positive signal from the squat switches 
on the main landing gear was violated. It also commanded the FADEC 
components to go into forward thrust mode, as no signal from squat switches was 
assumed to mean the aircraft was in air mode, causing the airplane to accelerate, 
overrun the runway and crash. 
 
2. In-flight Upset Flight 9M-MRG, Boeing 777-200 (August 1, 2005): Erroneous 
vertical, lateral and longitudinal acceleration data from the aircraft’s Air Data 
Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) caused a pitch upset event while the aircraft was 
climbing through 38,000 feet in a flight from Perth, Australia to Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia. A low speed and overspeed warning was reported simultaneously and 
the aircraft pitched up and climbed with a high vertical speed. In response, the 
crew had to return to Perth with the autopilot disengaged.4 
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Components: The components involved were the aircraft’s ADIRU, the Engine 
Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS), the autopilot and autothrottle. 
Component Functions and Relationships: The function of the ADIRU is to 
provide air data and inertial reference data to several systems on the aircraft, 
including the primary flight control systems, the autopilot flight director system 
and the flight management system. The air data modules receive pressure inputs 
from the pitot probes and static ports and use it to calculate and supply air data 
information to the user systems. The ADIRU incorporates six gyros and six 
accelerometers to calculate inertial reference and navigation data for the other 
aircraft systems.  
The engine indication and crew alerting system, or EICAS, displays all engine 
and aircraft system information required by the crew. The EICAS, in the 
operational mode, displays primary engine parameters and alert messages for 
monitoring by the crew in the upper display unit (DU), while the lower display 
unit shows secondary engine parameters. The alert messages on the upper DU are 
divided by priority into warnings, cautions, advisories, and data or 
communication and displayed in different colors. 
The autopilot flight director system (AFDS) has a mode control panel (MCP) and 
three autopilot flight director computers. The MCP controls the autopilot, flight 
director, altitude alert, and autothrottle systems. It is used to select and activate 
the various flight modes, and establish altitudes, speeds, and climb/descent 
profiles. The flight director computers control the flight directors and autopilot. 
The flight director information is displayed on the primary flight displays (PFD).  
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The autothrottle mode is engaged using a push-button switch for various pitch 
modes or, if no pitch mode is selected, in the speed mode. It can be disconnected 
by moving the throttle arm switch to off or by pushing an autothrottle disconnect 
push-button type switches on the engine thrust levers. Upon disconnecting the 
autothrottle, the EICAS displays a message saying “AUTOTHROTTLE DISC” 
and the master caution lights come on. When the autothrottle is armed it 
automatically activates if the autopilot is not engaged and the airspeed is less than 
what was commanded, or the thrust is below that required for the selected mode 
of flight. 
Axiomatic conditions: The ADIRU is a fault tolerant system with internal 
redundancies that automatically makes allowances for internal component faults 
to ensure the unit’s overall functionality. It contains seven fault containment areas 
with fault containment modules which are physically and electrically separated 
from the other modules. The aircraft ADIRU is designed with system redundancy 
to prevent any malfunctions from occurring. With only one erroneous input, the 
system is designed to automatically stop accepting that input and divert to another 
input source for information. That event does not require any action by the flight 
crew, and intends to minimize the number of checklist items that a crew needs to 
maintain. With multiple erroneous sources of information or internal failures in 
the ADIRU, the EICAS message NAV AIR DATA SYS is displayed. That directs 
the crew to the appropriate checklist and the unreliable airspeed table.  
Flight Conditions: On August 1, 2005 the Boeing 777-200 aircraft was climbing 
out through flight level (FL) 380 when the crew observed a LOW AIRSPEED 
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warning advisory on the aircraft’s EICAS. One of the accelerometers of the 
ADIRU had failed in June 2001, but was still capable of producing high 
acceleration values that were erroneous. The ADIRU was excluding the failed 
accelerometer in its acceleration computations. Another accelerometer failed 
during flight, causing the ADIRU to use the previously failed accelerometer 
information with its high output values in its computations, resulting in erroneous 
acceleration outputs into the flight control system. Hence, a latent software 
anomaly allowed the ADIRU to again utilize the previously failed accelerometer’s 
erroneous information into the flight control system.  
System Behavior: The aircraft’s EICAS showed a LOW AIRSPEED warning as 
the aircraft climbed through FL380. At the same time it was found that the 
aircraft’s slip/skid indication deflected to the full right position on the PFD, 
indicating that the aircraft is out of trim in the yaw axis. The PFD speed tape then 
indicated that the aircraft was approaching the overspeed limit and stall speed 
limit simultaneously. The aircraft nose then pitched up and the aircraft climbed to 
FL410. The indicated airspeed then decreased from 270 to 158 knots and the stall 
warning and stick shaker devices activated. The pilot in command then 
disconnected the autopilot and lowered the nose of the aircraft. The aircraft 
autothrottle then commanded an increase in thrust, which was countered by 
moving the thrust levers to idle manually. The aircraft nose pitched up again and 
the aircraft climbed 2,000 feet. The pilots subsequently requested from air traffic 
control a return to Perth. The PFD indications appeared normal while descending 
through FL200 with the autopilot disengaged. However, when the LEFT autopilot 
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was turned ‘ON’, the aircraft banked to the right and the nose pitched down. 
Similar result was seen when the RIGHT autopilot was selected. Hence, the pilots 
disengaged the autopilot and flew the aircraft manually. 
This case was a violation of the axiom of the ADIRU that several redundancies 
would ensure that the unit would function even if one of its components failed. 
Further, even though the EICAS displayed an ADIRU status message indicating a 
fault with the ADIRU, the flight crew was not provided with information that 
detailed the fault. 
 
3. Rudder Reversal USAir Flight 427, Boeing 737-300 (September 8, 1994): In 
this accident, a B737 aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and impacted terrain 
near Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. The accident investigation found that the rudder 
had reached its blowdown limit because of a power control unit servo valve jam 
which caused the rudder to deflect in the opposite direction to that commanded by 
the pilots.2,5 
Components: The components in the rudder control system which contributed to 
this scenario were the flight control system, auto-flight system, yaw damper 
system, main rudder power control unit (PCU) and PCU servo valve. 
Component Functions and Relationships: Flight Control about the vertical or 
directional (yaw) axis is provided by a single panel rudder, which is operated by 
moving either the right or left rudder pedal forward or aft. Flight control about the 
longitudinal (roll) axis is provided by an aileron on each wing assisted by two 
spoilers, which are operated by rotating the control wheel clockwise or 
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counterclockwise. Motion about the yaw and roll axes interact in flight. Hence, 
any yawing action (sideslip) causes the airplane to roll unless countered by 
ailerons. The auto-flight system provides control commands to the airplane’s 
ailerons, flight spoilers, horizontal stabilizer and elevators to reduce pilot 
workload and provide smoother flight; however, it does not provide commands to 
the rudder system. The yaw damper system automatically stabilizes the airplane 
about its yaw axis by limiting yaw motions caused by atmospheric disturbances or 
the airplane. The rudder panel is actuated by a single hydraulic power control unit 
(PCU). A standby rudder actuator is available if the hydraulic system fails. The 
maximum amount of rudder travel available for an airplane at a given flight 
condition/ configuration is known as the “blowdown” limit. The main rudder PCU 
converts either a mechanical input from the rudder pedals or electrical signal from 
the yaw damper system into the motion of the rudder by means of mechanical 
linkages and has a servo valve that directs hydraulic fluid either to extend or 
retract the PCU actuator rod that moves the hinged rudder surface. The main PCU 
servo valve is a dual-concentric tandem valve composed of a primary slide that 
moves within a secondary slide that, in turn, moves within the servo valve 
housing. These slides translate inputs from the yaw damper and/or external input 
crank (from rudder pedals) into axial movement of the slides. The clearances 
between the slides and between the secondary slide and housing are very small. 
Axiomatic Conditions: According to the design and working of the rudder power 
control unit, even in an abnormal condition such as a servo valve jam, a rudder 
pedal input resisting the jam is assumed to cause the rudder to move in a direction 
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opposite to the jam, towards neutral position, thus reducing the deflection of the 
rudder. Hence, a control reversal of the rudder was not considered as a possibility. 
Flight Conditions: The aircraft was maneuvering to land at Pittsburgh 
International Airport with a left turn at an airspeed of 190 knots and altitude of 
6000 feet MSL. There may have been wake turbulence from another aircraft. The 
pilots were trying to roll out of the turn to the intended heading. 
System Behavior: The aircraft continued to roll left rapidly, although the pilots 
were trying to arrest the turn, and eventually crashed into terrain. Tests during the 
accident investigation revealed that, when the secondary slide was jammed to the 
servo valve housing at certain positions, the primary slide could travel beyond its 
intended stop position because of bending or twisting of the PCU’s internal input 
linkages. This deflection allowed the primary slide to move to a position at which 
the PCU commanded the rudder in the direction opposite of the intended 
command (reversal). Specifically, the tests revealed that, when the secondary 
slide was jammed at positions greater than 50 percent off neutral toward the 
extend or retract position and a full-rate command was applied to the PCU, the 
rudder would move opposite to the commanded direction.  
 
4. Future Design of an Aircraft Adaptive Control System: In an attempt to make 
aircraft control systems more intelligent and be quickly able to adapt to any 
sudden changes in aircraft dynamics, there is an ongoing research in the 
development of adaptive control systems. A discussion with researchers on such 
systems led to the realization that these systems work under the assumption that 
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the direction of aircraft motion is always known for a given control input. For 
example, it is assumed that a left rudder input will always cause the aircraft to 
yaw towards the left. However, there have been several known scenarios of 
control reversals, as noted in the above rudder reversal example. It is further 
assumed that a fault, if any, would be handled by a fault management system. 
System Components: The components considered for a control reversal scenario 
in this case could be the aircraft adaptive control and the fault management. 
Component Functions and Relationships: The adaptive control system is used to 
adapt to abrupt changes in the aircraft dynamics or changes in aerodynamic 
system parameters when subjected to system faults or structural damage, and to 
stabilize the aircraft. The fault management system is a system of sensors, 
detectors and actuators for fault detection and transmission of feedback signals to 
the aircraft adaptive control system. 
Axiomatic Conditions: One of the key assumptions of an adaptive control system 
is that the adaptive controller knows the sign (positive or negative) of the 
relationship between a target state and the control actuator used to achieve it, and 
that, if there is any fault, it would be detected and addressed by some fault 
management system.  
System Behavior Study: As has been seen in the previous example and many 
other such cases, control reversals need to be considered in the design and 
reliability testing of future systems. Further, the requirement that the fault 
management can not only detect the control reversal in theory, but also that it can 
detect the reversal before the adaptive control places the aircraft in an 
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unrecoverable state, needs to be evaluated. Possible system behavior in such 
scenarios can be observed and understood only when these components are 
integrated. In a later chapter, this thesis looks at a similar control reversal scenario 
as a case study reflecting a violation of the adaptive control system axiom.  
  
In each of the above cases, there is a violation of a fundamental axiom of at least 
one of the system components that adversely impacts the behavior of other components 
and the aircraft’s dynamics. It can be noted that, even when all the components are 
working precisely in accordance with their given requirements, the interactions between 
the different components under certain conditions can cause the system to behave in an 
adverse way. 
1.3.2 Validation and Verification 
Complex systems consist of a range of distributed components which are 
developed and validated independently before integration. There are methods available to 
test and validate the component software extensively to ensure there are no errors in the 
code. Of note, hardware-in-the-loop simulation is used in the development and test of 
complex real-time embedded systems. The complexity of the aircraft dynamics is 
included in the testing with a computational model. The simulation can also include 
electrical emulation of sensors and actuators which act as the interface between the plant 
simulation and the embedded system under test. Human-in-the-loop studies are also done 
to examine human factors, using simulators which include plant simulations of 
aerodynamics, engine thrust, environmental conditions, flight control dynamics, etc. 
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A Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) is conducted at the beginning of the 
aircraft/system development cycle. FHA is recommended to be carried out at the system-
level as well as aircraft level to identify failure conditions and their effects, classify 
failure conditions based on the identified effects, and assign safety objectives. The 
outcome of FHA is the categorization of circumstances and severity of each failure 
condition along with the rationale for its classification. In this process the safety 
practitioner must evaluate each function for the impact of functional failure. Failure types 
include a function failing to be performed, operating earlier or later than it should have, 
operating out of sequence, being unable to stop operation or a malfunction or degraded 
function. Further, methods such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA), Common Cause Analysis (CCA), can each also identify specific 
safety concerns. 6 
The difficulty in testing complex systems is the ability to determine where to start 
the testing and how much testing is enough to be able to decide that all systems and 
system components meet the safety requirements. FHA may help get an idea of which 
conditions may be more hazardous than others. However, to evaluate possible 
catastrophic failure conditions which may emerge from the interaction of the 
components, key drivers of the dynamic relationships between components must be 
identified. For example, if an assumption underlying a component function is violated, 
the component may still perform its intended functions, but do so in conditions where 
these functions may cause other components to behave adversely.  
Hence, the validation process for complex aircraft systems may be further 
streamlined by studying the effect on the aircraft dynamics of violating such assumptions, 
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which are termed as “axiomatic set of conditions”, considered in the development of the 
system components. 
1.4 Approach 
This thesis applies system-wide simulation to validate a complex aircraft system, 
including dynamic emergent behaviors which impact reliability when all the components 
of the system are integrated. Such a system-level failure can be due to the violation of 
underlying assumptions that serve as the axiomatic set for each component; these axioms 
may either disable or disallow the actions of another component or agent, cause the 
failure of a component at an unexpected time, or modify the system behavior in some 
unexpected, adverse way. Therefore, this research focuses on the simulation of such 
complex systems to systematically explore the impact of violating the underlying axioms 
of the components on the reliability of the system. It thus validates whether all the 
components of the system and the system as a whole are maintained if any axiom is 
violated and, further, it validates the requirements for fault detection and fault 
management applied to the system. 
The simulation framework selected should enable the study of emergent behavior 
of any aircraft system, through an integration of its components, in the event of a 
violation of any axiomatic conditions. The generalized framework that has thus been 
employed for the case studies done in this thesis consists of the following key elements as 
shown in Figure 1.1: 
 Local models of components as simple dynamic representations of their target 
behavior and functions. These models do not need to be the complete 
representation of the component, as it would be when integrated into the actual 
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aircraft, but instead only need to emulate its intended behavior. For example, a 
sensor to monitor a particular aircraft state may just be a variable showing the 
output of the state at certain intervals of time, based on how often the sensor is 
actually supposed to monitor the state, with any important property such as 
latency or noise added as appropriate. Thus, components can be simulated earlier 
in the design process, before their internal behaviors are completely specified. 
 Communication channels between the components, for their integration, in the 
form of values or variables taken as input for a component, which may be the 
outputs from another component.  
 Axiomatic set of conditions for each of the components. These determine the 
capabilities of the component, and whether the component functions as intended 
or not. They may be applied as conditions on the operation of the component, and 
on their input and output properties. 
 Model representing the aircraft dynamics for the selected flight maneuvers to be 
simulated for a specific flight path and environmental conditions. 
 The ability to apply faults or unexpected events as required for the simulation, 





FIGURE 1.1: ELEMENTS OF A GENERIC SIMULATION FRAMEWORK 
 
 
1.4.1 Identify Component Functions and Axiomatic Set of Conditions 
The first step in the approach is to identify the key functions of the individual 
components of the aircraft system to be studied and create simple dynamic reference 
models to represent their intended behavior. For example, a fault management system 
may be represented as an action that detects a fault by checking if a condition is true or 
not without modeling all the sensors, avionics, etc.  
In addition, it is required to model the axiomatic conditions of the components 
which define required conditions for the functioning of the components. This enables 
testing the system with violation of any fundamental axiom. The axiomatic set of 
conditions of a component include the operational limits or range of conditions over 
which the component would be able to perform its intended function, and the 
assumptions about its inputs and outputs when interacting with other system components. 
Thus, the axiomatic conditions may be identified by understanding: 
1. The operational parameters known to affect the component state while performing 
its intended actions. 
2. The limits or boundaries of these parameters, under which the component 
operates without deviation from its normal functioning. 
• Component functions





• Aircraft state variables
Aircraft
• Axiom being violated





3. External design conditions for the component, such as the severity of 
environmental conditions within which the component can maintain normal 
functioning.  
4. The output that the component needs to provide to other components or agents, as 
well as input required from other components. 
1.4.2 Identify Potential System-Level Failures 
A system may fail due to a fault in any of the components of the system, as has 
been defined for the purpose of this thesis, under certain environmental conditions and 
circumstances. This thesis studies, through simulation of scenarios, the potential-system 
level failure when: 
1. A component is placed outside of its allowable environmental condition and it 
does not respond properly for that condition; 
2. All components act as desired, but the integration of the system as a whole fails 
in a given condition; or 
3. One of the components fails to perform its intended function. 
1.4.3 Identify Fault Detection and Fault Management Functions 
The thesis also observes the effect of a fault recovery after a fault has been 
introduced. Hence, based on the fault scenario to be studied, the time of fault detection 
can be controlled in the simulation to emulate a range of available fault detection 
methods and methods of recovery from the fault. 
To observe emergent behavior in the system when the axiomatic condition of any 
component is violated, the simulation model of the entire system, with all its components 
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integrated, is run along with the dynamic model of the aircraft. The flight conditions are 
set as required. At a certain point during the flight, the scripted fault or event may modify 
conditions, as required, to violate an axiom of a component, with the help of a “fault 
action”. The aircraft state is then monitored. After a certain later time, a corrective “repair 
action” may be incorporated to mimic fault management functions, which would attempt 
to bring the aircraft back to its intended state.  
To examine the system-wide implications of violating the axiomatic conditions of 
any of the components, specific scenarios have been selected to demonstrate the 
possibility of applying this simulation approach to the different ways in which emergent 
behavior could arise at the system-level when key axioms of the components are violated. 
This demonstrates how analysis of the axiomatic set of conditions can serve to identify 
test conditions warranting early attention. 
1.5 Objectives and Scope 
The objectives that this thesis satisfies through this approach are: 
1. Defining a method to capture and describe the underlying assumptions or 
axiomatic set of conditions of the components within a distributed system. 
2. Establishing a simulation framework for validation that can (a) incorporate 
models of relevant component functions, interactions between the components 
and a dynamic model of the aircraft, and (b) monitor the key axioms of the 
components. The simulation thus enables the identification of emergent 
behavior in a range of scenarios by introducing faults at varying times that 




3. Demonstrating the ability of the simulation to examine the system-wide 
implications of violating the axiomatic conditions of any of the components of 
the integrated system in the vehicle (aircraft) model, as well as actions seeking 





2.1 System Complexity and Integration 
2.1.1 Systems and System Elements 
A system is a combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or 
more stated purposes. A member of a set of elements that constitutes the system is a 
system element. These elements may include hardware, software, people, information, 
techniques, processes, facilities, services, and other support elements. If the system 
elements are systems themselves, typically the case in large-scale, interdisciplinary 
problems with multiple, heterogeneous, distributed systems, the system of interest can be 
termed a system-of-systems (SoS). These interoperating collections of component systems 
usually produce results unachievable by the individual systems alone. The INCOSE 
Systems Engineering Handbook mentions the challenge of complexity associated with the 
development of SoS where the addition of new system elements increases the number of 
interactions between the system elements in a non-linear fashion. Complexity also makes 
it hard to define data exchanges across the interfaces between system elements.7 
Overall, increased complexity can lead to unexpected and unpredictable system 
behavior. Among the many definitions of systems engineering, the one selected by the 
FAA Systems Engineering Manual is: “Systems engineering is a discipline that 
concentrates on the design and application of the whole (system) as distinct from the 
parts. It involves looking at a problem in its entirety, taking into account all the facets and 
all the variables and relating the social to the technical aspect.” Thus a systems 
engineering perspective is needed to find the emergent properties of a complex system.8 
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2.1.2 Distributed Systems and Emergence 
For the purpose of this thesis, a distributed system may be defined as a system of 
multiple processing elements or components, cooperating in a common purpose or to 
achieve a common goal. Distributed processing is defined in the IEEE Systems and 
Software Engineering Vocabulary as “information processing in which discrete 
components may be located in different places, and where communication between 
components may suffer delay or may fail.” 9 
Distributed control architectures are becoming popular in aircraft systems due to 
ease of installation, configuration and updating. However, the asynchronous execution of 
these processes, without central top-down control, can cause the emergence of 
unexpected behavior at the system level in the form of error conditions or noise. These 
are not necessarily random events or caused by unit malfunctions, but can be generated 
by deterministic interactions among the control elements under certain conditions.1,10 
2.1.3 Complex System Integration: Software, Hardware and Human Interface 
Bloebaum and McGowan contrast in their paper “The design of large-scale 
complex engineered systems” the nature of complex systems versus complicated systems 
(such as a television or a computer). They say that a complicated system can be 
developed using the classical reductionist approaches, where the system may be reduced 
to its basic elements or parts and then studied as a summation of its parts. On the other 
hand, in complex systems the interdependent elements exhibit dynamic and reflective 
intra-system behavior, which nullify the possibility of using reductionist approaches.11 
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Many new hazards are related to the increase in complexity of the new systems 
being developed. In turn, this increased complexity makes identifying these hazards more 
difficult. System accidents, as termed by Perrow12, are caused by interactive complexity 
in the presence of tight coupling. Increased complexity and coupling make it difficult for 
the designer to consider all the hazards, or even many important ones, or for the operators 
to handle all normal and abnormal situations and disturbances safely.13 
Today, computers are used in most systems to provide control functions, 
especially in safety-critical systems. They often replace traditional hardware safety 
interlocks and protection systems, or control existing hardware protection devices. New 
types of computer-related hazards appear in aircraft systems, primarily in flight control 
systems, navigation systems, and cockpit displays. They add a new dimension to the 
problem of human error. Some hazards are passive until just the right combination of 
circumstances arrives. Some result from the crew’s multitude of choices in aircraft 
system management, often during task prioritizing. Computers can be used in safety-
critical loops in many ways, with various levels of automation; for example, providing 
information to a human controller, interpreting data and displaying it to the controller, 
issuing commands directly but with human monitoring of the computer actions, providing 
varying levels of input, or eliminating the human from the control loop entirely. 
Computer-based systems are often meant to relieve pilot workload, which oftentimes 






2.2 System Safety and Validation 
2.2.1 System Safety and Hazard Analysis 
The FAA Systems Safety Handbook defines system safety as a specialty within 
systems engineering that supports program risk management. The goal of systems safety 
is to optimize safety by the identification of safety related risks, eliminating or controlling 
them by design and/or procedures, based on the system safety order of precedence shown 
in Table 2.1.14 
TABLE 2.1: SAFETY ORDER OF PRECEDENCE 14 




Design to eliminate risks. If the identified risk cannot be 





If identified risks cannot be eliminated through design 
selection, reduce the risk via the use of fixed, automatic, 
or other safety design features or devices. Provisions shall 




When neither design nor safety devices can effectively 
eliminate identified risks or adequately reduce risk, 
devices shall be used to detect the condition and to 
produce an adequate warning signal. Warning signals and 
their application shall be designed to minimize the 
likelihood of inappropriate human reaction and response. 
Warning signs and placards shall be provided to alert 
operational and support personnel of such risks as 





Where it is impractical to eliminate risks through design 
selection or specific safety and warning devices, 
procedures and training are used. However, concurrence 
of authority is usually required when procedures and 
training are applied to reduce risks of catastrophic, 
hazardous, major, or critical severity. 
 
System safety is related to the potential unreliability of the system and associated 
adverse events. Adverse events may potentially contribute to system accidents. 
Reliability is the probability that a system will perform its intended function satisfactorily 
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for a prescribed period of time under stipulated environmental conditions. Since nothing 
is perfectly safe, the objective of system safety is to attain the “optimum degree of safety” 
by eliminating or controlling known system risk to an acceptable level.  
While evaluating risk, contributory hazards are important. Contributory hazards 
are unsafe acts and conditions with a potential for harm. Unsafe acts are human errors 
that can occur at any time during the system lifecycle, while unsafe conditions can be 
failures, malfunctions, faults or system anomalies. An unreliable system may not be 
hazardous: systems can be designed to be fail-safe, with an assurance that no harm will 
result from contributory hazards.  
Hazard analysis is the process of examining a system throughout its lifecycle to 
identify inherent safety related risks. To accomplish this, system risks are identified 
within potential system accident scenarios with associated contributory hazards. Controls 
are then designed to eliminate or mitigate risks to an acceptable level. Scenario 
descriptions can vary from general to specific, depending on the detail of knowledge 
available to the analysis. Specific integrated analyses like human interface analysis, 
abnormal energy exchange, software hazard analysis and fault hazard analysis are used to 
evaluate interactions between system elements. These interactions between system 
elements include interrelations between human, machine, environment and procedures. 
These methods, along with hazard control analysis, are used to analyze the possibility of 
insufficient control of the system. The purpose of this analysis is to identify possible 





2.2.2 Current Standards and Guidelines for Validating Aircraft Components 
The process outlined in the SAE standard ARP4754A “Guidelines for 
Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems” presents the guidelines for developing 
aircraft-level, system-level, and item-level (or component-level) requirements to establish 
confidence for aircraft systems as a whole. The process includes validating requirements, 
verifying that requirements are met, and configuration management and process 
assurance activities. The safety analysis process is used in conjunction with a 
development assurance process to identify failure conditions and severity classifications 
which are used to derive the level of rigor required for development. 
According to ARP4754A, complex systems and integrated aircraft level functions 
present greater risk of development error (requirements determination and design errors) 
and undesirable, unintended effects. It mentions the impracticality of developing a finite 
test suite for highly-integrated and complex systems which would conclusively 
demonstrate that there are no residual development errors. Since these errors are 
generally not deterministic and suitable numerical methods for characterizing them are 
not available, other qualitative means have been proposed to establish that the system can 
satisfy safety objectives. In this context, ARP4754A/ED-79A regards the activities of the 
RTCA documents DO-178C/ED-12C “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification” and DO-254/ED-80 “Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne 
Electronic Hardware” as a means to implement the development assurance rigor for the 
software and electronic hardware aspects of the design. However, these software and 
electronic hardware related processes are no longer considered to be adequate to mitigate 
aircraft/system errors without a development assurance process from aircraft-level down 
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to the item-level. Here an item is hardware or software component having bounded and 
well-defined interfaces, a system is a combination of interrelated items arranged to 
perform a specific function, and multiple distributed systems combine at the aircraft-
level. 
Thus, regulatory authorities have highlighted concerns about the efficiency and 
coverage of the techniques used for assessing safety aspects of highly integrated systems 
that perform complex and interrelated functions, particularly through the use of electronic 
technology and software based techniques. The concern is that design and analysis 
techniques traditionally applied to deterministic risks or to conventional, non-complex 
systems may not provide adequate safety coverage for more complex systems. Thus, 
other analysis techniques for assurance, validation and verification may need to be 
applied at the aircraft-level, or at least across integrated or interacting systems to increase 
confidence that errors in requirements or design, and integration or interaction effects 
have been adequately identified and corrected. Revisions have been made to Title 14 
Code of Federal Regulations (14CFR) for Airworthiness Standards, the Advisory Circular 
for System Design and Analysis (AC 25.1309), the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) Certification Specification (CS-25), etc. addressing these concerns to include 
new approaches, both qualitative and quantitative, which may be used to assist in 
determining and establishing compliance with safety requirements considering the whole 
aircraft and its systems. It also provides guidance for determining when, or if, particular 
analyses or development assurance actions should be conducted in the frame of the 
development and safety assessment processes. Figure 2.1 outlines the relationships 
between the various development documents, which provide guidelines for safety 
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assessment, electronic hardware and software life-cycle processes and the system 









Although the current guidelines and processes talk about the importance of 
considering system integration for the validation of components in systems of increasing 
complexity, the methods available at this time may not be adequate to identify emergent 
system behavior. ARP4754A discusses the difficulty of developing a finite test suite for 
highly-integrated and complex systems which would conclusively demonstrate that there 
are no residual development errors, stating that it may be impractical to do so. They 
mention that, in such cases, a qualitative analysis may be more practical in order to 
determine which failure modes must be studied.  
This thesis proposes that validation methods for such complex systems can be 
streamlined by directing their testing towards axioms of the system components, that is, 
the effect of assumptions and limiting design considerations based on which the 
components have been designed, and the system-level interactions due to the violation of 
these axioms under certain conditions. Further, it studies the importance of considering 
time based impact of faults and fault recovery, which could impact whether the aircraft 
can recover after the time lag between a fault recovery action and the aircraft recovery.  
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3 APPLIED SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 
3.1 Work Models that Compute 
For the purpose of performing case studies to show the application of the 
proposed simulation framework, this thesis used the simulation environment “Work 
Models that Compute” or WMC. WMC is used, primarily, to model complex interplay of 
activities in complex work environments. The key aspect, work, is the pattern(s) of 
activity required to meet some goal(s) within a complex environment.  This activity has 
to mirror the demands of the environment: for example, flying an aircraft requires sensing 
the aircraft state and moving the control surfaces in a manner consistent with the 
aircraft’s dynamics, and picking a route of flight must consider both physical aspects of 
the environment (e.g., the aircraft performance, winds), and the “intentional” aspects of 
the environment created by established procedures and regulations (e.g., interacting with 
air traffic control according to published regulations).  Models of work, or work models, 
should represent not only what this activity is, but also when it happens and how it 
impacts the work environment. 17,18 
Thus, the fundamental aspect of WMC, the work model, defines actions required 
to complete the required task, and resources to capture the aspects of the environment.  
Resources are the computational structures that capture aspects of the environment. For 
example, the work model of flying an aircraft would include resources that capture the 
aircraft’s states. Actions respond to the environment by “getting” resource values and 
then act upon the environment by “setting” resources; a ‘flyaircraft’ action, for example, 
gets the resources representing aircraft state and simulates what their next value should 
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be at the end of a simulation timestep, setting the new, updated values into the resources.  
In this thesis, the construct of actions is used to emulate component functions.   
Work models describe all the actions that need to be done by some agent.  
Correspondingly, agent models are invoked at run-time to handle or execute whatever 
actions are required of them.  A BasicAgentModel is created for each work model that 
does nothing but pass-through actions that are required (and can log its actions as it goes).  
More complex agent models can be invoked and assigned specific actions to examine 
how the human handles all the actions assigned to them (e.g., how many do they have, do 
they need to delay some) and may examine on-going situation awareness of the resources 
that these actions get and set. 
Once the relevant work model(s) and agent model(s) are ready, then the 
simulation runs are conducted in the conduct of a scenario.  A scenario invokes the 
relevant work models through scripts.  As many work models can be called as desired, 
including multiple instances of the same work model.  Further, several scripts can call 
upon the same work model for different scenarios. The scenario tells the script the 
termination criteria for the simulation. Through a script, the scenario creates actions and 
resources for the work models it invokes, assigns actions to a BasicAgentModel or any 
additional agent model, schedules the next update times for the actions as desired, 
changes the initial values of resources, etc.  
One of the main benefits of WMC is its ability to strictly control the timing of 
actions. Thus, the aircraft dynamic model can apply a continuous non-linear 6DOF 
dynamic model with timesteps of its own choosing, and other components can apply 
whatever model form (discrete event, expert system, script, etc) that best models their 
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desired component functions. Some actions can be triggered at pre-scripted times. For 
example, a scenario can examine the time based impact of faults on the system and the 
aircraft dynamics by setting when the fault is introduced into the system and when the 
recovery action is initiated.  
Further, rather than passing data between actions, all actions act upon “resource” 
values stored within the simulation framework; this structure mirrors a common databus 
as appropriate for some data values; further, it enforces a modular structure on the 
component models that reduces the re-programming of one component model when 
another component is changed. 
If there is a desire to model any component more accurately than as performance 
of its nominal function, that would just require adding more actions or adding detail to its 
established actions. Hence, at a later point in the design stage, more details can be 
included in the component models and a more detailed study will be possible. 
3.1 Aircraft Model in WMC 
The methodology applied in this thesis requires a dynamic model of an aircraft 
with its control system, including all autopilot control loops and a 6 degree-of-motion 
dynamic model to observe the effect of violating axiomatic conditions involving flight 
control. WMC provides a built in model of a flight control system of a large transport 
aircraft with a generic adaptive controller. It uses an adaptive control architecture for 
inner-loop attitude control to create a stable control behavior that follows a given 
reference model. This model allows the specification of the closed-loop behavior of the 
aircraft and the controller (pilot or autopilot). Further, the outer-loop guidance generates 
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the attitude commands to the inner-loop element to achieve a specified velocity, heading 
and altitude.  
3.2 Applying Component Models in WMC  
Application of the approach proposed in this thesis requires integration of several 
components to simulate their functions and their interactions. These components are 
further integrated with the model of the aircraft dynamics to study the aircraft behavior 
during faults and fault recovery. These components are represented by their component 
functions within WMC. Some of the component functions modeled within WMC are: 
Aircraft Adaptive Control: The function of an adaptive control system is to 
adapt to any change in dynamics to stabilize the aircraft. It is normally difficult to 
implement closed-loop invariant behavior associated with manual aircraft control as well 
as models of automated flight control system behavior into simulations without inverting 
the aircraft dynamics. With recent advances in adaptive control, the desired closed-loop 
inner-loop dynamics of an aircraft and its control system can be obtained by specifying 
them as reference models. This has been implemented in WMC by using an adaptive 
control architecture that allows pilot or flight control system closed-loop inner-loop 
dynamics to be specified in the control of detailed, non-linear aircraft dynamic models. It 
eliminates the adaptive elements of the control architecture of the aircraft in the 
simulation and provides a simple, generic implementation suitable for many situations. 19 
Fault Management: The fault management component includes fault detection, 
communication of the fault to the relevant components and aircraft recovery from the 
fault. The component function itself does not necessarily require any detailed modeling 
of specific electronic or physical components. Instead, the fault detection function can be 
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simulated through actions scheduled at fixed times which indicate when the fault has 
been detected and schedule the recovery action. Hence, the effect of the time required for 
fault detection can be studied. Likewise, depending on the scenario being studied, the 
fault recovery action can be defined as acting on the components which need to change 
their behavior to try to recover the aircraft state. The fault recovery action may be 
performed by the adaptive control system, or by autopilot or autothrottle functions which 
may disregard certain erroneous values, or by a pilot who may disable the autopilot or 
change autoflight modes or change values in the mode control panel, etc. 
Autoflight Functions: The autopilot and autothrottle flight modes have been 
modeled in WMC as control loops which can be enabled or disabled to engage or 
disengage different flight modes. They also allow setting of values of the aircraft state 
that can be commanded to be maintained for the different flight modes. The aircraft 
model then changes the aircraft dynamics and flight path based on the selected modes and 
set values. The flight modes in WMC are based on a generic Boeing 747-like aircraft. 
The outer loops include the altitude, airspeed, vertical speed, flight level change, flight 
path angle and heading loops, while the inner loops include the phi (roll angle), beta (side 
slip), theta  (pitch angle) and thrust loops. The altitude loop sets the pitch attitude and 
vertical speed to reach the commanded altitude. The airspeed loop sets the commanded 
thrust to maintain a commanded indicated airspeed. The flight level change (flch) loop 
varies the pitch to maintain a commanded indicated airspeed, with a constant thrust 
commanded using the thrust loop. The vertical speed (vspeed) loop varies the pitch to 
maintain a specified rate of climb or descent. The flight path angle loop maintains a 
specified flight path angle for climb or descend by adjusting the pitch. The heading loop 
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varies the roll angle to reach a commanded heading. Selection and change of these 
control loops to simulate the selection of autopilot and autothrottle modes and setting 
commanded values as done via a mode control panel (MCP), by using the 
changeControlLoop function in a script or work model, or through an action to schedule 
the time at which a flight mode is changed during the simulation. 
Pilot Operations: The case studies performed for this thesis do not model pilot 
behavior in the aggregate. Instead, specific tasks to be done by the pilot are scheduled 
through actions. For example, the action of a pilot changing flight modes or entering 
values into the MCP is modeled through an action to change control loops at scheduled 
times in the simulation. Error in performing the tasks can also be scheduled, as can 
actions to recover from a fault by enabling or disabling flight modes or changing 
commanded values, etc. 
3.3 Configuring WMC 
Any scenario to be simulated is configured using scripts which invoke the 
necessary work models and schedule actions representing component functions. In the 
fault scenarios simulated for this thesis, the script specifies the start and end time of the 
simulation and provides termination criteria for the simulation. It then invokes the work 
model to fly an aircraft. This work model contains a flyaircraft action which enables all 
the control loops and simulates the aircraft dynamics. The script which runs the fault 
scenario or case study specifies the initial values for the aircraft state.  
Axiomatic conditions of the components are then violated by invoking an action 
introducing a fault. An action is created to take corrective action when the fault is 
detected to simulate fault management functions. The fault detection is scheduled, and as 
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desired, any fault recovery. The aircraft state is monitored by getting the values of the 




4 CASE STUDY: ELEVATOR CONTROL REVERSAL 
Control reversals have been known to occur in certain flight conditions, like the 
rudder control reversal of the USAir flight 427 noted in Chapter 1, or some combination 
of structural malfunction/degradation and aeroelastic effects. This case study was 
motivated by contrasting such control reversal incidents with the underlying axiom of the 
most proposed adaptive control systems that assume the sign of the relationship between 
the elevator deflection and pitch would always be known. This axiom thus also requires 
fault detection and fault recovery functions. 
This hypothetical case study looked at an elevator control reversal scenario, and 
thus, demonstrated the effect of the aircraft’s response to violation of a component’s 
(adaptive control) axiomatic condition due to being placed outside its allowable 
environmental condition. Applying the proposed simulation framework, the study looked 
at the effects of an elevator reversal with increasing fault duration before a fault detection 
and recovery action was invoked. 
4.1 System Components 
The components of the aircraft system, considered for this scenario, were the 





4.1.1 Component Functions 
The aircraft adaptive control system emulates all aircraft control surfaces, 
connecting linkages, and automated control through the Flight Control Unit. It functions 
to control the aircraft dynamics and adapt to any change in the dynamics to maintain the 
aircraft’s stability. The fault management function monitors and detects unexpected 
behavior in the aircraft dynamics, and notifies the adaptive control system once it detects 
a fault so that the control system can correct its internal assumption of the sign of the 
relationship between control input and resulting motion. 
4.1.2 Axiomatic Conditions 
The key axiom of the adaptive control system is that the direction of motion of the 
aircraft in response to a given control actuator input is always known. It also assumes that 
any control reversal, which would be termed as an abnormal condition, would be handled 
by the fault management system through fault detection and reporting to the adaptive 
control system.  
4.1.3 Component Interactions 
Given a control input to the elevator, the direction of the resulting pitching 
moment is known by the aircraft control. The fault management checks whether the 
direction (sign) is appropriate or reversed. In case of a fault in the direction of the aircraft 
pitching moment, a resource variable which takes a boolean value of TRUE/FALSE is 




4.2 Simulation Execution 
4.2.1 Scenario 
The aircraft is in a continuous descent from an altitude of 10,000 feet with 
airspeed of 250 knots and a vertical speed of 700 fpm. An indicated airspeed of 230 knots 
is then commanded at the start of the flight. The aircraft’s normal flight profile without 
any fault is as seen in Figure 4.1. 
 
FIGURE 4.1: FLIGHT PROFILE FOR AIRCRAFT IN DESCENT 











































FIGURE 4.1 CONTINUED 


















































































4.2.2 Fault Introduction and Recovery 
One hundred seconds after the start of the simulation, as the aircraft was 
descending through an altitude of 10,000 feet MSL, slowing to an airspeed of 230 knots, 
the fault was introduced: the direction of aircraft pitching moment became opposite of 
what was expected for the given elevator input. This is a violation of one of the axiomatic 
conditions of the aircraft adaptive control, that is, the assumption that the direction of 
motion of any control surface is always known for a given control input.  
The fault duration, that is the time taken for the fault to be detected by fault 
management and for corrective action to be taken by the adaptive control, was varied. 
The fault management function alerts the adaptive control system. The adaptive 
controller then effectively repairs the control reversal.  
4.2.3 System Behavior 
Figure 4.2 shows the effect of an undetected elevator control reversal on the 
aircraft. Figure 4.3 shows the aircraft behavior when the fault is detected, conveyed to the 






FIGURE 4.2: EFFECT OF ELEVATOR REVERSAL FAULT WHEN FAULT IS INTRODUCED AT 100 
SEC 









































































































































FIGURE 4.3: ELEVATOR REVERSAL FAULT REPAIRED AFTER 5 SEC OF FAULT 
INTRODUCTION 






















































































FIGURE 4.3 CONTINUED 
 
4.3 Impact of Fault Recovery Functions 
4.3.1 Comparison of Results 
The recovery was affected by the fault duration as shown in Figure 4.4. For 
example, when the fault was not detected for 11 seconds, the aircraft continued to pitch 
downward with increasing pitch attitude even after the fault recovery action was initiated 
till it reached a downward vertical dive. The rate of descent increased to greater than 
30,000 fpm and the aircraft crashed in approximately 30 seconds from the time the fault 
was initiated. In contrast, when the fault was detected within 5 seconds, the aircraft was 
able to regain its intended state even after a sudden drop in altitude due to the fault. 










































After the fault was detected and the repair action was initiated, the aircraft 
required a certain duration of time before it started regaining its intended state. Hence, in 
this case study it was observed that aircraft recovery would not be possible beyond a fault 
duration of 10 seconds.  
The results of this case study thus demonstrate how key assumptions in one 
component can be tested in the context of the entire system. It also showed how the 
component functions may have a time attached to them, such as the allowable delay in 
fault detection.  
  
FIGURE 4.4: COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT BEHAVIOR WITH VARYING FAULT DURATION 


































FIGURE 4.4 CONTINUED 
 









































































FIGURE 4.4 CONTINUED 
 
4.3.2 Outcome of Study 
This study enabled identifying a key requirement to be considered in the 
development of a fault management function – the fault duration. It was found that the 
fault duration affected not only the aircraft recovery but also the duration of safe flight 
after recovery. This would help determine the time available for the fault management to 
ensure the safety requirements are maintained. The following Figure 4.5 shows the time 
required for the aircraft to recover to a stable vertical speed descent after the elevator 















































reversal fault is introduced, based on the time of fault detection. After 10 seconds of the 
fault, the aircraft is unable to recover, hence this has been depicted as zero.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.5: TIME REQUIRED TO RECOVER AIRCRAFT DESCENT RATE AFTER FAULT 
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5 CASE STUDY: ERRONEOUS AIRSPEED DATA 
This case study examined possible adverse emergent behaviors at the system-level 
when all components were performing their set functions as desired but received bad 
input from the environment, in this case with plugged pitot tubes.  
This scenario was inspired by past aircraft incidents in which the Air Data Inertial 
Reference Unit (ADIRU) provided erroneous airspeed data. The ADIRU uses multiple 
redundant sensors to help compute the aircraft attitude. It receives total pressure and 
static pressure inputs from three pitot and static pressure sources, and compares them to 
get a reliable estimate of airspeed, altitude and vertical speed that is both given to the 
autopilot and portrayed to the pilots. The indicated airspeed is a function of dynamic 
pressure, that is, the difference between total pressure obtained from the pitot probe and 
the static pressure.  




Pt: Total Pressure (psf) (ram pressure), from pitot probes 
 Ps: Static Pressure (psf), from static pressure sources 
 ρ: Air Density (slug/ft3) 
 V: Airspeed (knots) 
Indicated airspeed is calculated by calibrating the air density to that at sea level at 
standard conditions i.e., 0.0023769 slug/ft3. 
Hence, indicated airspeed: 
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑 =  √





The airspeed indicator becomes unreliable if the pitot probes are blocked. This 
resulting erroneous indicated airspeed is then fed to other systems including overspeed 
warnings, windshear warnings, the autopilot, autothrottle and flight directors20. For 
example, the autothrottle system may erroneously sense an overspeed and command a 
thrust reduction which might result in a stall, or the autopilot may command an abrupt 
pitch up.  
Several accidents and incidents related to plugged pitot tubes were noted in 2009, 
including the crash of the Air France Flight 447 into the Atlantic Ocean on June 1, 2009 
in which the pilots reacted adversely to wrong airspeed data, which caused a 
disconnection of the autopilot and autothrottle21, an incorrect airspeed and altitude 
information incident on a TAM Airlines Airbus A330-200 flight 8091 in cruise flight on 
May 21, 200922, and another airspeed anomaly incident in cruise flight on an Airbus 
A330-323 Northwest Airlines flight on June 23, 200923. In reference to these incidents, 
this case study observed the effect of completely plugged pitot probes leading to 
erroneous airspeed input to the aircraft control system, and the impact of fault 
management with varying fault detection times. 
5.1 System Components 
The components which have been considered to simulate this scenario are the Air 
Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU), autopilot, autothrottle, and fault management.  
5.1.1 Component Functions 
The pitot probes provide pitot pressure or ram pressure to the ADIRU, which then 
computes the airspeed based on the inputs from the pitot and static pressure sources and 
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provides a single airspeed as output to the autopilot and autothrottle systems. The 
autopilot sets the pitch attitude to attain a specified vertical speed for the descent or 
climb, given the pitch mode selected. The autothrottle provides the required power 
settings to maintain the airspeed set in the Mode Control Panel (MCP) in speed (SPD) 
mode, or a commanded thrust in thrust (THR) mode. The fault management detects any 
discrepancy in the airspeed data and reports it to the autopilot and autothrottle systems. 
These systems will respond by disregarding the airspeed data from the ADR system, and 
adjusting to a safe power and pitch setting to return to the intended flight path. 
5.1.2 Axiomatic Conditions 
The design of the ADIRU assumes that the several redundancies in the form of 
multiple pitot tubes ensures that the airspeed calculation within the ADIRU is immune to 
any isolated failures of the sensors and pressure probes, but this axiom can be violated 
when all the pitot tubes ice over. Any error in the pressure data obtained from the pitot 
probes is assumed to trigger the fault management to alert the autopilot/autothrottle. 
5.1.3 Component Interactions 
The total pressure data from the pitot tubes is used by the ADIRU to calculate the 
indicated airspeed, which is relayed to the autopilot and autothrottle. These autoflight 
systems use this airspeed data and vary the pitch and power settings to match it with the 
commanded airspeed as entered in the MCP. In case of a discrepancy between 
commanded and true values of airspeed, the fault management notifies the autopilot and 




5.2 Simulation Execution 
5.2.1 Scenario 
The plugged pitot tubes cause an error in the indicated airspeed calculated by the 
ADIRU system such that, the calculated indicated airspeed does not reflect changes in 
true airspeed; but instead only varies with the different static atmospheric pressures at 
different altitudes. Since an airspeed has been commanded to be maintained in all the 
studies, the aircraft tries to maintain a constant indicated airspeed. Since the indicated 
airspeed is erroneous, the constant indicated airspeed leads to an error in the true 
airspeed. The fault management detects the problem in each simulation run and notifies 
the autopilot and autothrottle systems. The autopilot then sets the pitch of the aircraft to a 
stable attitude, while the autothrottle maintains the power to descend or climb as 
necessary, disregarding the indicated airspeed. This requires disabling the autopilot and 
autothrottle modes. Four different flight profiles have been studied: 
1. V/S mode descent 
2. V/S mode climb 
3. FLCH mode descent 
4. FLCH mode climb 
The Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 show the normal flight 





FIGURE 5.1: NORMAL FLIGHT PROFILE FOR V/S DESCENT MODE 
 





















































































FIGURE 5.2: NORMAL FLIGHT PROFILE FOR V/S CLIMB MODE 




























































































FIGURE 5.3: NORMAL FLIGHT PROFILE FOR FLCH DESCENT MODE 
























































































FIGURE 5.4: NORMAL FLIGHT PROFILE FOR FLCH CLIMB MODE 
 
























































































5.2.2 Fault Introduction and Recovery 
All the pitot tubes get completely plugged at a scheduled time in the simulation 
due to some environmental factors, causing their inability to obtain the ram pressure 
input. The air pressure in the tubes before they get plugged becomes the constant pressure 
input to the ADIRU. Since the aircraft is in a climb or descent, the static pressure keeps 
changing as it increases with decrease in altitude. This causes an error in the calculated 
indicated airspeed which is a function of the difference in static and total pressure.  
To recover from the adverse behavior of the aircraft due to this scenario, the 
reliance on airspeed data is disabled by disengaging the airspeed control loop or flight 
level change control loop, whichever is engaged, and setting a pitch angle and thrust to be 
maintained to perform the descent or climb as required. 
5.2.3 System Behavior 
When the fault is introduced, that is, the pitot tubes are plugged, it is a violation of 
the axiom that the several redundancies would prevent incorrect airspeed data being 
obtained from the ADIRU. When the autopilot tries to maintain the erroneous indicated 
airspeed according to the commanded value, the true airspeed of the aircraft is affected as 
the aircraft climbs or descends. This causes the flight path to change unexpectedly and 




5.3 Impact of Fault Introduction and Recovery 
5.3.1 Comparison of Results 
Impact of the fault involving a pitot tube block was studied for the four selected 
flight paths. The recovery action was studied in the vertical speed descent case for two 
possible parameters for fault detection which affected the time of fault detection. 
5.3.1.1 V/S Descent 
When the aircraft is in a V/S descent and the fault is introduced about 100 
seconds from the start of the simulation, the true airspeed is found to increase while the 
autothrottle attempts to track the erroneous indicated airspeed. This effect builds as the 
difference in the total and static pressures increases with decrease in altitude. This thus 
causes the aircraft to start climbing.  
5.3.1.1.1 No Fault Recovery 
It is noticed that the effect on the altitude is seen more than 500 seconds after the 
fault is introduced. This occurs due to a sudden increase in vertical speed as the thrust 
goes to a maximum value to try to maintain the commanded indicated airspeed. The true 
airspeed reaches a high value which eventually stabilizes as no more power can be added. 





FIGURE 5.5: V/S DESCENT - FAULT NOT REPAIRED 























































































FIGURE 5.5 CONTINUED 
 
5.3.1.1.2 Fault Detected 150 sec after Pitot Tubes Plugged 
If the fault is detected after the true airspeed is found to become lower than the 
indicated airspeed and then increase, which confirms an error, the aircraft behavior is as 
seen in Figure 5.6. The fault is detected 150 seconds after the pitot tubes are plugged. To 
recover, the airspeed loop is disabled and fixed values of pitch and thrust are commanded 
to recover the intended flight path. It is found that a gradual recovery is possible in this 
case. Figure 5.6 shows the results of this simulation. 
 














































FIGURE 5.6: V/S DESCENT – FAULT DURATION 150 SEC 
 






















































































FIGURE 5.6 CONTINUED 
 
5.3.1.1.3 Fault Detected 600 sec after Pitot Tubes Plugged 
However, if it is not possible to monitor the true airspeed and the fault is detected 
only after the altitude starts increasing when the aircraft is supposed to descend, the 
recovery, though possible, is found to be more difficult. It was found from this case study 
that it is not just the time after which the fault is detected that would affect the aircraft 
recovery; it is also the commanded values of thrust and pitch required to achieve a stable 
recovery. It is also noted that the time at which the fault can be detected is dependent on 
various factors, like which parameters need to be monitored to enable earliest detection of 
the fault. Figure 5.7 shows the results of this simulation. 













































FIGURE 5.7: V/S DESCENT – FAULT DURATION 600 SEC 
 























































































FIGURE 5.7 CONTINUED 
 
5.3.1.2 V/S Climb 
When the fault was introduced during a V/S climb, 100 seconds from the start of 
the simulation, the aircraft was found to stall about 250 seconds after the fault was 
introduced. Figure 5.8 shows the results of this simulation. 
 














































FIGURE 5.8: PITOT TUBES PLUGGED IN V/S CLIMB 
 























































































FIGURE 5.8 CONTINUED 
 
5.3.1.3 FLCH Descent 
During a flight level change descent in which the autopilot commanded elevator 
to pitch to maintain indicated airspeed, the aircraft was found to descend at a much faster 
rate than it normally would, with the true airspeed increasing throughout. This could 
cause the airplane to crash catastrophically if the fault is not repaired in time. The altitude 
was found to decrease rapidly because the power is set to idle for a flight level change 
descent. Figure 5.9 shows the results of this simulation. 
 
















































FIGURE 5.9: PITOT TUBE PLUGGED IN FLCH DESCENT 


























































































FIGURE 5.9 CONTINUED 
 
5.3.1.4 FLCH Climb 
In the case of a flight level change climb, the altitude stops increasing after a 
certain time after the fault is introduced as the thrust is at a maximum value for FLCH 
climb mode while the true airspeed is decreasing due to the fault. Eventually, it could 
cause the aircraft to stall and start falling rapidly. Figure 5.10 shows the results of this 
simulation. 
 

















































FIGURE 5.10: PITOT TUBES PLUGGED IN FLCH CLIMB 

























































































FIGURE 5.10 CONTINUED 
 
5.3.2 Outcome of Study 
This case study helped understand several requirements for the fault management 
which can affect the aircraft recovery: 
Firstly, the phase of flight or flight path that the aircraft is following. It was found 
that the effect of the fault depended on the selected autoflight modes and whether the 
aircraft was in a climb or descent. Each of the studied flight paths had distinctly different 
results and hence, the aircraft recovery functions will vary based on the flight path. 
Secondly, the parameter selected for fault detection. In this case it was observed 
that depending on whether the true airspeed or an abrupt change in altitude was 














































considered as the parameter to detect the fault, the time at which the fault was detected 
varied. 
Finally, the fault duration. Depending the time after which the fault was detected, 
the recovery of the aircraft was affected. Hence, the longer the fault duration, the more 
difficult the recovery. This aspect can help determine the time available to ensure safe 
recovery of the aircraft and thus, the parameter to be selected for easy detection of the 
fault to ensure a timely recovery.  
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6 CASE STUDY: HUMAN-AUTOMATION INTERFACE 
FAILURE 
The third case study observed changes in system behavior when a component 
failed to perform its required function. In this case, the pilot was considered as the 
component that failed to perform the required actions for landing an aircraft in normal 
flight conditions, causing the emergence of adverse system behavior.  
This case was inspired by an aircraft accident in June 2013 where an Asiana 
Airlines flight, a Boeing 777-200, stalled and collided with the sea wall while landing at 
San Francisco International Airport. The pilots appear to have failed to comprehend how 
their selected autopilot modes, commanded altitude and airspeed, and an autothrottle 
setting commanding idle power caused the aircraft to slow to unsafe airspeeds.24 
The Mode Control Panel (MCP) of a Boeing 777 aircraft has autopilot (A/P) 
engage and disengage switches, as well as the various autopilot flight director system 
(AFDS) modes like ALT, HDG HOLD, V/S, TO/GA, LNAV, VNAV and FLCH. 
Through these modes, the AFDS provides autopilot pitch, roll and yaw commands to the 
Primary Flight Control System (PFCS) when the autopilot is engaged, and the pitch and 
roll commands on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) when the flight directors are 
engaged. The autothrottle system controls include left and right arm switches to control 
the left and right engine autothrottle respectively. The autothrottle is coupled with some 
AFDS pitch modes (VNAV, FLCH or TO/GA). For example, if the FLCH, or flight level 
change mode, is operational during descent, the autothrottle operates in thrust mode, 
generally commanding idle thrust for descent and full power for climb. With other pitch 
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modes (e.g. ALT, V/S), the autothrottle can be put into SPD mode which varies throttle 
to control speed.  
In the Asiana Airlines accident, the autopilot was in the vertical speed (V/S) pitch 
mode with a descent rate of 1000 ft/min, and the autothrottle was in SPD mode to 
maintain a set airspeed. The altitude set in the mode control panel (MCP) was the missed 
approach altitude, i.e. 3,000 feet. At about 1,200 feet altitude, a pilot selected FLCH 
mode to descend quickly as they were high relative to the approach path. The autothrottle 
mode changed to thrust mode and the aircraft started climbing towards the MCP altitude 
of 3000 feet. Seeing this, a pilot disengaged the autopilot and manually brought the 
throttle lever to idle to descend. This caused the autothrottle to go to HOLD mode, with 
the autothrottle holding idle power. When the pilots entered an airspeed in the MCP, it 
was not automatically maintained by the autothrottle as it was not in SPD mode, and the 
idle power caused the airspeed to reduce until the aircraft stalled. This accident appears to 
have occurred due to violation of the assumption that the pilots know all the autopilot and 
autothrottle modes, and the behavior of the autopilot flight director system and the 
primary flight control system in response to the modes they select. Thus, it was seen that 
commanding inappropriate autoflight modes, and their interactions with the control 
actions executed by the pilots, may cause the emergence of an adverse flight condition.  
6.1 System Components 





6.1.1 Component Functions  
The pilot’s functions for this case study include enabling or disabling autopilot 
and autothrottle modes, commanding values like airspeed, vertical speed, altitude, thrust, 
etc. depending on the modes selected, and monitoring the active flight modes, which are 
available on the primary flight display, and the aircraft state, by observing the flight 
instruments.  
The autopilot functions are to command the aircraft to maintain the values 
commanded by the pilot and to update the aircraft state based on the active autopilot 
mode. 
The autothrottle functions set the power based on whether it is in SPD mode or 
THR mode. In SPD mode, it adjusts power to maintain a commanded indicated airspeed, 
whereas in THR mode it maintains the commanded power setting. Manual operation of 
the autothrottle causes it to switch to HOLD mode, where it no longer controls the 
airspeed and maintains the current power setting. 
6.1.2 Axiomatic Conditions 
It is assumed that the pilot is aware of the outcomes of selecting any autopilot and 
autothrottle modes, and can predict the aircraft state that will result in response to any 
input commanded by him/her. Further the pilot is assumed, during final approach, to 
continuously monitor the aircraft state and to take necessary actions to recover from any 





6.1.3 Component Interactions 
The pilot provides inputs to the autopilot by selecting specific modes from the 
mode control panel. Depending on the flight modes selected, the autopilot will command 
the primary flight control system to take appropriate control action on the aircraft, while 
the autothrottle will provide the thrust control or speed control based on the autothrottle 
mode selected. 
6.2 Simulation Execution 
6.2.1 Scenario 
The aircraft is in V/S mode in a descent for landing at 4,000 feet with a vertical 
speed of 1,000 fpm and maintaining an indicated airspeed of 180 knots. An indicated 
airspeed of 160 knots is commanded at the start of the simulation. About 150 seconds 
from the start of the simulation, when the altitude is just under 2,000 feet, the pilot 
changes the control loop to FLCH attempting to descend at a faster rate; however, the 
autothrottle increases the power to maximum takeoff thrust and the aircraft starts 
climbing. This is due to a wrongly entered higher altitude in the MCP. After 90 seconds 
the pilots notice the rise in altitude and disable the autopilot and manually command an 
idle thrust and lower the pitch. The autothrottle, still being engaged, goes into HOLD 
mode, holding idle power. After descending for a minute with a high descent rate, the 
pilots command an indicated airspeed of 150 knots by entering it in the MCP and 
command the aircraft to maintain a fixed flight path angle of 3 degrees to maintain the 







FIGURE 6.1: NORMAL FLIGHT PROFILE FOR PILOT DESCENDING WHILE CHANGING 
MULTIPLE FLIGHT MODES 
 




















































































FIGURE 6.1 CONTINUED 
 
6.2.2 Fault Introduction and Recovery 
When the autothrottle goes into HOLD mode at idle power the airspeed is not 
being controlled by the autothrottle. Thus, the pilot commanding an airspeed of 150 knots 
on the mode control panel does not have any effect on the airspeed. However, in this case 
the pilot assumes that the autothrottle is engaged in SPD mode and also fails to perform 
his required monitoring functions completely. This is a violation of the axiom that the 
pilot knows all autopilot modes or autothrottle settings and monitors the aircraft state.  
At a later time in the simulation, the pilot may realize that the airspeed is too low 
or the aircraft is unstable and descending at too high a rate and unable to maintain the 
glide slope and would try to recover by applying full throttle and attempting a go-around. 
This recovery action must be done early enough to be able to perform a go-around. 











































6.2.3 System Behavior 
With the autothrottle in HOLD mode, it did not control airspeed. Since the power 
was set to idle, this caused the airspeed to reduce. The airspeed continued to reduce 
below the commanded value until the pilot realized this fault and set the autothrottle to 
maximum thrust to recover. The fault duration is varied to observe the aircraft’s possible 
recovery. Figure 6.2 shows the effect of the undetected fault while Figure 6.3 shows the 
effect of a timely initiated recovery action after the fault was introduced. 
 
FIGURE 6.2: PILOT ERROR INTRODUCED AT 300 SEC (THRUST REMAINS ON IDLE) 
 









































FIGURE 6.2 CONTINUED 

















































































FIGURE 6.3: PILOT FAULT DETECTED AND GO-AROUND INITIATED 20 SECONDS AFTER 
FAULT INTRODUCTION 
 










































































FIGURE 6.3 CONTINUED 
 
6.3 Impact of Fault Recovery Functions 
6.3.1 Comparison of Results 
As in the previous two case studies, it was found that the fault duration affected 
the aircraft recovery. It was found that, after the recovery action was initiated, the aircraft 
continued to descend at a fast rate for a certain time before it recovered. Hence, beyond 
40 seconds from the fault introduction, the aircraft was too close to the ground and unable 
to recover. It was found to hit the ground with a high vertical speed. Figure 6.4 shows the 
impact of fault recovery on the aircraft with varying fault duration. 













































FIGURE 6.4: COMPARISON OF RESULTS FOR PILOT ERROR WHILE CHANGING FLIGHT 
MODES 
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FIGURE 6.4 CONTINUED 
6.3.2 Outcome of Study 
In this study too it was found that the parameter selected for fault detection 
affected the time at which the fault could be detected, hence the possibility of aircraft 
recovery. It was noticed that if the pilot detected the fault when the indicated airspeed 
reduced below the commanded value, the aircraft could be recovered; however, if the 
fault was detected only after the aircraft abruptly pitched downwards, the aircraft was too 
close to the ground to be able to recover.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Summary 
This thesis proposed a simulation-based method to validate large-scale complex 
aircraft systems. Examining several aircraft accidents, it was noted that the aircraft 
behaved in an unexpected manner when conditions on the functioning of a system 
component were violated. These conditions were defined in the thesis as axiomatic 
conditions of the system components. The thesis thus proposed that, by identifying the 
axiomatic set of conditions of the system components and studying the system behavior 
when these axioms are violated, it is possible to identify and observe potential emergent 
unexpected behaviors in the system. Thus, the thesis proposes that testing and validation 
of large scale systems can be fostered by early identification of potential adverse 
behavior that when: 
1. A component is placed outside of its allowable environmental condition and it 
does not respond properly for that condition; 
2. One of the components fails; or 
3. All components act as desired, but the system as a whole fails in a given 
condition. 
This thesis showed that, by simulating the violation of component axioms in the 
integrated system, where the components are modeled as dynamic reference models of 
their intended key functions, it is possible to quickly determine the parameters to be 
considered in the development and validation of such complex aircraft systems. It was 
demonstrated, by simulating three case studies, how emergent behavior can be observed 
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in the system and the aircraft state using this approach. The method also identified the 
requirements of any fault management function.  
7.2 Contributions 
This thesis, first, contributed a method to capture and describe the underlying 
axiomatic set of conditions of the components of a distributed system. This method 
describes the general set of parameters to be considered to enable identifying the 
component axioms. Those parameters capture the requirements and design considerations 
of the component for its intended function. By identifying the axiomatic conditions of the 
components of the complex aircraft system to be studied and observing the emergent 
system behavior when these axioms are violated, possible adverse system behavior can 
be identified early, focusing test and validation efforts on likely problems.  
Second, it contributed a simulation framework for validation which (a) 
incorporated models of relevant component functions, interactions between the 
components and a dynamic model of the aircraft, and (b) monitored the key axioms of the 
components. Through this, it enabled the identification of emergent behavior in a range 
of scenarios by introducing faults at varying times that violated key axioms and varying 
the duration after which the fault was detected. Hence, it is possible to understand 
through simulation of the integrated complex system, all the important considerations to 
be taken to avoid or recover from a fault which involves the violation of a component 
axiom. This includes identifying requirements for fault management that recognize key 
aspects of the dynamics that might limit how long a fault duration can be tolerated, or a 
relationship between fault detection time and the type of fault recovery that will be 
required. Further, simulation of component functions enables evaluation of important 
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failure modes and emergent effects of such faults earlier in the design process than 
current component-in-the-loop testing allows.  
Finally, this thesis demonstrated, using three case studies, the ability to examine 
the system wide implications of violating the axiomatic conditions of any of the 
components of the integrated system in the aircraft model as well as subsequent fault 
management functions. This method may be implemented later in the development 
process as well, by including more detailed functions or more detailed models of the 
components. Implementation of this method at every stage in the development process 
can help determine many fault scenarios which could lead to unfavorable and dangerous 
behavior in the aircraft and which otherwise go unnoticed. In this way, this method has 
the ability to scale to a full complex aircraft system, as it models the component functions 
rather than detailed full scale models of the components. It can also help to ease the 
process of finding fault management methods for such cases and help prevent those faults 
by taking all important considerations into account. This method can be especially 
advantageous when developing and implementing new and novel technologies for safety 
critical aircraft systems, to ensure that they will satisfy all the safety objectives. At 
present, it takes several years to implement new ideas for the fear that there is no method 
to determine with confidence that such systems will function safely.  
7.3 Future Work 
The work in this thesis looked at some broad areas to consider based on ways in 
which emergent behavior can be identified in testing based on component axioms. This 
gave a broad perspective on the application of violating component axioms for system 
validation. As a future work, it may be required to focus the testing on more specific 
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areas; for example, specific to the type of system being tested, the number of components 
or detail of component functions included, or the stage of development the system is in. 
Further, detailed advancement may be required in the area of identifying the 
axiomatic set of conditions for all system components. Through the thesis the definition 
of axiomatic conditions and the process of identifying them has been understood, 
however the implementation of this process to systematically determine the entire 
axiomatic set of conditions of any component may be required. 
More specifically, the validation process through this approach would need to be 
carried out by a system validation group, which would need information from the 
developers/designers of the components about the requirements and design 
considerations incorporated into the component design to identify the axiomatic set of 
conditions of the components based on their functions towards the overall goal of the 
system being tested. Since this approach can help identify requirements for fault 
management, it can also potentially be applied by the developers of a fault management 
system for validation of selected fault management functions, and to test various fault 
detection and recovery options. 
Finally, this approach would need to be applied at every stage in the development 
process to ensure adequate coverage of all component functions. At the start of the design 
process, it could be applied to validate the high level functions of the components by 
violating specific axiomatic conditions for the preliminary design considerations. Further 
in the design process, more detailed models of the component functions would need to be 
included and the number of axiomatic conditions would increase.  
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It would also be interesting to perform a study considering the effects of 
cascading failures, where a violation of an axiom of one component may lead to the 
violation of several other axioms. This can be done either through sequential scheduling 
of axiom violations, or through incorporating the axioms of the component through 
component interactions such that simulating a violation of one axiom would 
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